gomboreli told us just a very small part of the recent history, which is already enough to see how it is continued in the present events. The link between some earlier years and the present provided by
gomboreli characterises the current regime in Russia so well that it cannot be dismissed.
Russian aggressiveness abroad has been accompanied by such domestic changes as strangling independent media (especially, TV) and imposing the new state control of media (which is used for minimizing any criticism of state and for making propaganda), misbalances in power structure (building so-called vertical power and alike), the take-over of oil and gas industry (using these resources as a weapon in international relations), unfair elections, assassinations of the Kremlin’s critics, very hostile campaigns against opposition, in general; discrimination against independent NGOs and sponsoring fascistic-like youth organizations (Nashi, Molodaya Gvardiya, etc.), and so on.
When the current financial crisis broke out in Russia, Putin just warned everybody to avoid using word “crisis”. The man seems to be totally lost in his virtual reality.
Putin said that the outflow of foreign capital from the country is triggered by "speculation from western companies", but his former economic adviser A.Illarionov stated that Russia itself is for the most part to blame for its current financial crisis. Among the reasons for Russian crisis, the economist mentioned „the contradiction between [on the one hand] the open global markets, the process of integration of Russian society in the world system, the tolerance and respect as leading principles of international co-existence and [on the other hand]
Russian authorities' paranoid and aggressive foreign policy and cult of isolation and violence“ – source: <!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-115354">http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-115354</a><!-- m -->
The Kremlin lied about its actions in Caucasus heavily. As for the war against Georgia, read this:
Russia’s Long-Planned Invasion on „The New York Times“
Saakashvili saved Georgia from coup, former Putin aide says
http://euobserver.com/24/26921
Illarionov Commenter Proves Russia started the Georgia Conflict
http://larussophobe.wordpress.com/2008/0...-conflict/
N.B. I saw much more details on the web in other languages (Russian and other) - it only takes time to translate smth from that.
Andrey Illarionov: Second Georgian War
http://www.finrosforum.fi/?p=1240
And this is how Vladimir Ryzhkov, one of the scarce democratic opposition politicians in the Russian parliament, characterized the regime (excerpt from the full text of the stunning description):
[for full text:
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/20...7/006.html]
[for full text:
http://larussophobe.wordpress.com/2008/0...ections-2/]
Putin’s regime is the Russian version of the typical authoritarian model. One could describe its foundation in terms of a bureaucratic monopoly. Russia shares the following fundamental characteristics with countries such as China, Pakistan, Egypt, Belarus, Iran and Venezuela: heavy policy control, censorship in the main media channels and the systemic hounding and persecution of nongovernmental organizations, human rights groups and opposition parties. The absence of the rule of law is also a standard for all autocracies. Another characteristic that Moscow shares with other authoritarian governments is the enormous role that the security services, including the Federal Security Service and Prosecutor General’s Office, play in society. But in contrast to other autocratic governments, the main source of Russia’s authority is the so-called vertical power structure, composed of 1.6 million federal bureaucrats — a figure that has grown 1.5 times since Putin has come to power. In China and Cuba, for example, the source of power is a monopoly political party; in Chile during Pinochet’s reign, it was the army; in Iran, it is the religious leaders; and in Saudi Arabia, it is the ruling dynasty.
In contrast, there was some division of power under President Boris Yeltsin. The main centers of power in the 1990s were:
• the president and his administration
• the ministers in the Cabinet, who had a fair amount of autonomy, particularly under Prime Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yevgeny Primakov
• governors who were popularly elected
• large business
• mass media
• political parties in the Duma
During the Yeltsin era, political consensus depended on striking compromises among the Duma, Federation Council, Cabinet and even within the Kremlin.
Not a trace of these elements of pluralism has remained under Putin’s presidency. For the last seven years, all of the above-mentioned centers of influence have been stripped of their independent authority. Having just become president in 2000, Putin began constructing his vertical power model by taking control of the three largest nationwide television stations. Then, he weakened governors as an independent power base by reforming the Federation Council and by canceling direct gubernatorial elections. Then the Kremlin moved on to destroying the political power of business <…>
All power is now concentrated in the hands of bureaucrats. <…> One could say the government has been strengthened and reborn, but it has assumed a grotesque and malignant form where corruption and lawlessness have become more important than civil duty among bureaucrats.
The crown jewels of the country’s national wealth have ended up in the hands of Putin’s inner circle. <…>
<…> Putin has created a Soviet-oligarchic model: a synthesis of Soviet monopoly on political power combined with the nepotism and corruption from the 1990s. <…>
See also
A plea to save Russia from an enemy within
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